Holbrookering in Iraq?
Observation on the possibility of a Bosnian-style federation in Iraq, first drafted on Sept. 25, 2007
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We have to admit that our own assertion whereby a local strongman is the only viable exit strategy for the US in
Iraq (see: The Pitfalls of Exuberance) does not let us sleep easy at night. And so we may be forgiven if we revisit that. For
too dramatic are the implications here, that we should not be allowed to think them over again.
Given therefore that responsibility requires us to do some additional soul searching here, it seems reasonable to
us, to consider Amb. Holbrooke’s federation idea now. For too much could this be another feasible alternative
here, that we should not feel compelled now, to contemplate it still.
After having looked at his proposal though, it appears to us, as if there are at least four aspects which make it
hard to believe that a simple transfer of the Bosnia peace model to Iraq is possible. For too different are
circumstances here that a simple repetition of things is imaginable.
These four issues that cause particular headache are the following:
First, the Iraqis neighbors, notably, Iran and Turkey are less likely, to respect a new federal agreement in Iraq
than this has been the case with Bosnia’s neighbors. For even higher are the perceived stakes that these
neighbors have in Iraq that they could now easily be convinced to either lend their support (in this case of
Turkey) to such a Bosnian-style solution or to at least stop undermining it. (in the case of Iran).
Secondly, Iraq is situated in an even more volatile geographic region than the Balkans are. And so it is also more
likely that the larger unresolved Middle East peace situation will continue to unleash destabilizing forces onto the
new Iraqi federation. For too probable is it that outside tensions (for example the Iranian nuclear bomb issue) will
also effect the co-existence in Iraq, that one could now presume, that this will not cause continuous upheavals.
Thirdly, the cultural background in Iraq is more tribal and more feudal, than it was in the case in Bosnia. And so it
is less likely that future provincial governments will be able to discipline their own internal forces. For too disparate
are the allegiances that Iraqis have, that this should not result in new and so far unforeseeable skirmishes.
Fourthly, there continues be the unresolved question as to how to distribute the proceeds from the Iraqi oil fields.
Now, granted, this might be the most easy issue to be resolved in such a federation. But the fact that it has not
been resolved up to now, bodes not so well for a sustainable solution of the problem in future.
Having outlined these difficulties though, we would still consider it negligent not to have tried a Bosnia style
approach here. For too wonderful would it be, if this were to work against all odds, that one should not encourage
Mr Holbrooke now, to pursue this route all the same.
Observation on the possibility of a Bosnian-style federation in Iraq, first drafted on Sept. 25, 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have to admit that our own assertion whereby a local strongman is the only viable exit strategy for the US in
Iraq (see: The Pitfalls of Exuberance) does not let us sleep easy at night. And so we may be forgiven if we revisit that. For
too dramatic are the implications here, that we should not be allowed to think them over again.
Given therefore that responsibility requires us to do some additional soul searching here, it seems reasonable to
us, to consider Amb. Holbrooke’s federation idea now. For too much could this be another feasible alternative
here, that we should not feel compelled now, to contemplate it still.
After having looked at his proposal though, it appears to us, as if there are at least four aspects which make it
hard to believe that a simple transfer of the Bosnia peace model to Iraq is possible. For too different are
circumstances here that a simple repetition of things is imaginable.
These four issues that cause particular headache are the following:
First, the Iraqis neighbors, notably, Iran and Turkey are less likely, to respect a new federal agreement in Iraq
than this has been the case with Bosnia’s neighbors. For even higher are the perceived stakes that these
neighbors have in Iraq that they could now easily be convinced to either lend their support (in this case of
Turkey) to such a Bosnian-style solution or to at least stop undermining it. (in the case of Iran).
Secondly, Iraq is situated in an even more volatile geographic region than the Balkans are. And so it is also more
likely that the larger unresolved Middle East peace situation will continue to unleash destabilizing forces onto the
new Iraqi federation. For too probable is it that outside tensions (for example the Iranian nuclear bomb issue) will
also effect the co-existence in Iraq, that one could now presume, that this will not cause continuous upheavals.
Thirdly, the cultural background in Iraq is more tribal and more feudal, than it was in the case in Bosnia. And so it
is less likely that future provincial governments will be able to discipline their own internal forces. For too disparate
are the allegiances that Iraqis have, that this should not result in new and so far unforeseeable skirmishes.
Fourthly, there continues be the unresolved question as to how to distribute the proceeds from the Iraqi oil fields.
Now, granted, this might be the most easy issue to be resolved in such a federation. But the fact that it has not
been resolved up to now, bodes not so well for a sustainable solution of the problem in future.
Having outlined these difficulties though, we would still consider it negligent not to have tried a Bosnia style
approach here. For too wonderful would it be, if this were to work against all odds, that one should not encourage
Mr Holbrooke now, to pursue this route all the same.
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